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Tolling the Statute of Limitations for
Battered Women After Giovine v. Giovine:
Creating Equitable Exceptions for Victims
of Domestic Abuse
I. Introduction
On July 1, 1994, Christina Giovine brought an action against
her husband for dissolution of marriage and damages for his
intentional tortious conduct during their twenty-four year mar-
riage.1 She alleged a "continuous and unbroken wrong" beginning
less than one year after their marriage and continuing throughout
twenty-one years of the marriage.2 These claims were dismissed
by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations.3
On appeal from this ruling, the plaintiff alleged that her
husband's conduct, which consisted of mental and physical abuse,
caused her severe emotional and physical injury,4 and contended
that the continuing damage she suffered constituted battered
woman's syndrome (BWS).5 The Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court ruled that this claim could form a "continu-
ous tort"6 sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, provided she
could show that she was suffering from the syndrome.7 The court
required her to establish through medical, psychiatric or psycho-
logical expert testimony that her condition caused her to have an
"inability to take any action to improve or alter the situation
unilaterally."8 If she could establish this, her claims against her
husband would not be barred by the statute of limitations, thus
1. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
2. Id. at 112.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 118.
5. Id. at 113.
6. For a discussion of the continuous tort doctrine, see infra part IV.A.1.
7. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 114.
8. Id. (quoting Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)).
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enabling her to seek recovery for the many years of alleged
domestic abuse that contributed to her medical condition.9
By invoking the continuous tort doctrine, the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Supreme Court held that battered
woman's syndrome can be used to extend the statute of limitations
in tort. This decision makes it possible for victims of domestic
abuse to receive compensation for physical and mental cruelty
suffered throughout an entire marriage, even though the abusive
acts occurred more than two years prior to the commencement of
the victim's cause of action.1° This is significant because the
statute of limitations has traditionally posed the greatest obstacle
to recovery for battered spouses who sue their abusers."
Battered woman's syndrome (BWS), a sub-category of post
traumatic stress disorder, 2 is the psychological condition resulting
from a pattern of domestic abuse.13 BWS evidence was first used
as a component of a defense in criminal trials and it is now used in
many areas of civil litigation. The syndrome, which results from a
long-term pattern of abuse, is characterized by low self esteem,
passivity and creation of a learned helplessness. 4 It explains why
a woman remains in an abusive relationship over a period of
time." It also helps explain why a woman in an abusive relation-
ship may be unable to take any affirmative action, such as bringing
civil or criminal charges against her abuser to remedy the situa-
tion.'
6
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court is
currently the highest court in the country to allow civil recovery for
battered woman syndrome. 7 While many courts have been
9. Id. at 123-24.
10. The applicable statute of limitations for "an injury to [a] person caused by [a]
wrongful act" in New Jersey is two years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987).
11. For a detailed discussion of statutes of limitation, see infra part IV.
12. Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Approach
to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1034 (1992). Post traumatic stress
disorder refers to the psychological impact caused by traumatic events. James Wilson
Harshaw III, Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitutionality of Short Statutes of
Limitations for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 756 (1989).
13. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371-72 (N.J. 1984). For a detailed discussion of
battered woman's syndrome, see infra part III.A.
14. See infra part III.A.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Thorn Weidlich, 'Battered Woman' Tort Gains, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A6.
In June 1994, a Washington Superior Court recognized a tort of "domestic violence." Jewett
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reluctant to expand the statute of limitations, an increasing number
of courts have been willing to create equitable exceptions in a
variety of situations. The clearest example lies in the case of adult
survivors of child sexual abuse who are unable to file their claims
within the limitations period because they suffer from repressed
memory syndrome.18  As the seriousness of the problem of
domestic abuse receives more media attention and societal
recognition, more courts will be persuaded to follow the example
set by New Jersey.
This Comment discusses how BWS can be used to toll the
statute of limitations in tort. Part II gives a brief history of spousal
abuse and the state of the law prior to Giovine, discussing the
traditional civil remedies used to compensate battered women and
the problems faced by these plaintiffs. 9 Part III provides an
overview of battered woman's syndrome and the admissibility of
BWS evidence at trial, tracing its application in both criminal and
civil cases. The statute of limitations and equitable exceptions to
the statute are examined in part IV. The continuous tort doctrine
is also examined, along with its application to domestic violence
cases. Another equitable exception, the discovery rule, is discussed
as it has been used in repressed memory syndrome cases. A
comparison is then made between battered woman's syndrome and
repressed memory syndrome as both are used to toll the statute of
limitations. Potential criticisms of the Giovine decision and its
ramifications are then addressed. Finally, part V concludes that
Giovine sets an important precedent that should be followed
nationwide.
v. Jewett, No. 93-20-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane Co. 1994).
18. See infra part IV.B.
19. As the vast majority of domestic abuse is committed by men, this Comment refers
to the plaintiffs in domestic abuse cases by the female pronoun. "In 95% of all domestic
violence assaults, crimes are committed by men against women." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (1983).
This is in no way intended to undermine or ignore the seriousness of domestic abuse when
the victim is male.
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II. Background: History of Domestic Violence and the State of
the Law Before Giovine
A. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Domestic violence has traditionally been viewed as a private
family matter between husband and wife, and the legal system has
typically been reluctant to intrude into this sphere.' Historically,
a marriage was said to create one legal entity-the husband.2"
Under English Common Law, a woman's legal identity was
suspended during marriage, and her husband acquired all of her
causes of action, along with her property interests.22 This preven-
ted any tort action from being maintained between husband and
wife.' By 1875, however, every state had enacted Married
Woman's Acts which granted women greater legal rights to own
and protect their property interests.24 The majority of courts
limited these acts to property interests while granting broad
immunity for all other torts.2 This became known as the common
law doctrine of interspousal immunity.26 Courts explained that the
creation of this immunity was necessary to maintain the "peace and
20. For example, the English common law "Rule of Thumb" permitting a man to beat
his wife with a stick no thicker than his thumb was not eliminated until the end of the
nineteenth century. R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE VICTIMIZATION AND EXPLOITATION OF
WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A STUDY OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND SEXUAL MALTREATMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1994).
21. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433-45. "[T]he husband and wife are one
person in the law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." Id. at
*442. The notion of husband and wife becoming one legal entity is based upon the Biblical
notion that two people become "one flesh" upon marriage. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort
Immunity In America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 363-64 (1989).
As early as the Roman Era, a woman was viewed as the property of her husband and
he could beat her for nearly any reason. See R. E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WIVES 34-36 (1979). For example, any offense that tarnished her husband's honor
and reputation was seen as a legitimate legal justification for a beating. Id. at 36-37.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. b (1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. at cmt. c. See Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse,
43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 561-63 (1992).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cnt. c. Neither spouse could sue the
other for torts such as "assault and battery, false imprisonment, defamation, malicious
prosecution or personal injuries resulting from negligence." Id.
26. Id. at cmt. c. See Tobias, supra note 21, at 383-92 (explaining the incorporation of
interspousal immunity into the common law).
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harmony of the home"27 and to prevent "trivial actions for petty
annoyances."'
The doctrine reached a climax in 1910 with Thompson v.
Thompson.29 In Thompson, the United States Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted a Married Woman's Act and prevented a wife
from recovering against her husband in tort for assault and
battery.3 ° This decision marked a turning point for the broad
societal acceptance of interspousal tort immunity. Led by Justice
Harlan's dissent in Thompson,31 the growing acceptance of
women's legal status and the contemporary criticism of judicial
legislation, many courts began to interpret Married Woman's Acts
more liberally to encompass interspousal tort actions.3
Albeit slowly, most courts have begun to recognize the
seriousness and pervasiveness of domestic abuse. The prior
justifications for immunity have been rejected in light of the judicial
and societal recognition of women's rights and the goals of tort
law.33 Today, most jurisdictions have abolished interspousal tort
immunity either in whole or in part.'
B. Legislation Addressing Domestic Violence
The first federal attempts to address domestic violence were
not proposed until the late 1970s.35 These measures, which
focused on researching the problem and funding shelters, were
ultimately defeated.36 Opponents viewed the proposed legislation
as an inappropriate federal encroachment into private family
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 895F cmt. d. (1979).
28. Id.
29. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
30. Id. The Court reasoned that allowing tort claims between husband and wife would
open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the
other, and bring into public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel, and
alleged injuries to property of the one or the other, by husband against wife or
wife against husband. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be
promotive of the public welfare and domestic harmony is at least a debatable
question.
Id. at 617-18.
31. Id. at 619-24 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
32. Tobias, supra note 21, at 409-22.
33. Id. at 467-72.
34. Scherer, supra note 24, at 562-63. See also Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern
Status of lnterspousal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92
A.L.R.3d 901 (1979).
35. See 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 580 (1978).
36. See 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 443 (1980).
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matters.3 7  It was not until 1984 that the first comprehensive
federal measure, the Family Violence Prevention and Services
Act,38 was passed. This act provided $65 million to states for
funding shelters and for research into domestic violence.3 9
The Violence Against Women Act,4° part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,41 is the most
recent piece of federal legislation to address domestic abuse. The
Act authorizes grants to state and local governments to institute
and expand cooperative efforts between law enforcement, prosecu-
tors and victim advocacy groups for the purpose of investigating
and prosecuting domestic violence and child abuse; provide
treatment and counseling to victims; and develop community
education and prevention strategies directed at domestic violence
and child abuse.42  The Act also creates a civil rights remedy for
any violent crime motivated by gender,43 and provides for non-
37. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: New State and
Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1543 (1993) [hereinafter
Legal Responses]. Many conservative groups, including the Moral Majority, felt the
legislation was an attack on the family and that it promoted radical feminist objectives.
Opponents also considered it to be an undue interference into the realm traditionally
occupied by state and local governments. Id. Proponents of the legislation, however, argued
that there was currently insufficient state and local funding to deal with domestic abuse
victims. Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative
Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 998 n.110 (1989).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10418 (1988).
39. Legal Responses, supra note 37, at 1543. The Act, like the 1970s legislation, was
designed primarily to aid the abuse victims, rather than to prevent the abuse itself. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 13971(a) (1994).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). This section of the Violence Against Women Act has
been the most controversial. The first action brought under this section was dismissed by
Judge Jackson L. Kiser of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, who held § 13981 to be unconstitutional. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). Following United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), he concluded that § 13981 was an impermissible exercise of Congressional power
under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp.
779. Judge Kiser reasoned that
[w]ithout a doubt violence against women is a pervasive and troublesome aspect
of American life which needs thoughtful attention. But Congress is not invested
with the authority to cure all of the ills of mankind. Its authority to act is limited
by the Constitution, and the constitutional limits must be respected if our federal
system is to survive.
Id. at 801. Interestingly, in a similar case decided five weeks earlier, Judge Janet Bond
Arterton of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that § 13981
was constitutional. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that "[a]
rational basis exists for concluding that gender-based violence, which the [Violence Against
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profit organizations with expertise in domestic violence to train
judges to deal more competently with domestic abuse and stalking
cases.
44
Presently, each state has its own individual legislation to aid
abuse victims and prevent domestic violence.45 Much of this
legislation focuses on the issuance of restraining orders to prevent
domestic abuse.4 6 Additionally, states have expanded the ways in
which a victim can receive civil compensation for domestic abuse
under the torts of assault, battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 47 These remedies, however, have not gone
very far in compensating victims for the effects of long-term
spousal abuse.
C. Traditional Civil Remedies
Every year in America, more women are abused by their
husbands than get married.48 One study claimed that as many as
one half of all couples experience at least one incidence of
domestic violence.49 Social scientists estimate that as many as two
million women are abused by their spouses each year.50 These are
Women Act's] Civil Rights Remedy regulates, is a national problem with substantial impact
on interstate commerce and thus is a proper exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.").
44. 42 U.S.C. § 14036 (1994).
45. Sewell, supra note 37, at 1002.
46. Restraining orders, however, are often less than effective because they are often
difficult to enforce and can provoke a violent spouse to retaliate. See Kohler, supra note 12,
at 1033. Traditional police responses have also been criticized for their ineffectiveness. See
Sewell, supra note 37, at 1006-08. See also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's
Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV.
267, 298-302 (1985) (describing the traditional justifications for police nonintervention in
domestic affairs). Some states have enacted mandatory arrest policies for domestic abuse
situations. Nancy James, Domestic Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and a Survey of
Modern Laws, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509, 513 (1994). The effectiveness of mandatory arrest policies,
however, has been somewhat controversial. See Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic
Violence, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST., Fall 1995 at 2 (discussing the contemporary studies on various
police responses to domestic violence).
47. See generally Scherer, supra note 24 (discussing the remedies available under
traditional tort causes of action).
48. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 383, 386 (1994).
49. ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS, 11-15
(1977).
50. FLOWERS, supra note 20, at 158 (1994). In a 1985 survey, Richard Gelles, a
sociologist at the University of Rhode Island, found that of the 60 million couples living in
the United States, about 3.4 percent experience "severely abusive" incidents of "kicking,
choking, or threatening with a knife or gun." Rachel L. Jones, In Senate and Court, Setbacks
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alarming statistics, and they are even more startling considering the
fact that the United States Department of Justice estimated that
wife assault is underreported by a factor of at least ten to one.
Victims of domestic violence have utilized traditional civil
remedies to seek compensation for the physical or psychological
injuries caused by their abuse. When appropriate, plaintiffs can
also be awarded punitive damages. The torts of assault, battery
and intentional infliction of emotional distress have been the most
effective means of compensating victims who have been subject to
domestic abuse. 2 A number of cases have awarded abuse victims
large sums for such torts arising in the marital context.
For example, in Curtis v. Firth,53 the Supreme Court of Idaho
affirmed a jury verdict for a plaintiff who sued her common-law
husband for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The plaintiff claimed she was subjected to a recurring pattern of
"antagonism and violence '54 characterized by verbal and physical
abuse during her ten-year intimate relationship with the defen-
dant.55 The jury awarded her a total of $1,050,000, which included
$725,000 in punitive damages.
56
While Curtis remains one of the largest awards in this type of
action, other courts have allowed recovery on similar claims.57
for Efforts Against Spousal Abuse, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 17, 1996, at A3.
51. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE U.S.:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 1975 (pp. 18-19). The Bureau of Justice Statistics declared that
"[u]nderreporting remains the most serious analytic problem. Available measurements of
domestic violence, no matter what their origin or intent, are too low." U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE VICTIMS: A STUDY OF VIOLENCE
AMONG FRIENDS AND RELATIVES, 3 (1980). See also LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 19-20 (1979) (refuting the myth that domestic abuse affects only a small percentage
of the population).
52. See Scherer, supra note 24, at 555-61 (discussing the remedies available under these
traditional torts).
53. 850 P.2d 749 (Idaho 1993).
54. Id. at 751.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Supreme Court of Idaho remanded the case for a more thorough
consideration of the defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of excessive damages.
On remand, the trial court denied the motion and this denial was upheld by the supreme
court. Curtis v. Firth, 869 P.2d 229 (Idaho 1994).
57. But see Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). The New Mexico
Court of Appeals found that a husband's actions against his wife were insufficient to form
a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The husband's conduct consisted of
assaulting and battering his wife, insulting her in public, and locking her out of the house in
the dead of winter. Id. at 1321. He also pushed her face into a pot of dirt and slammed a
truck camper shell on her head. Id. at 1322. The Hakkila court held that the threshold for
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld an award of
$13,619.85 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages for
"numerous assaults and batteries" inflicted upon a plaintiff by her
husband during the last four months of their marriage.58 In a
similar divorce action in Texas, the Court of Civil Appeals upheld
a jury award of $20,000 to a plaintiff for the "injuries and mental
anguish" caused by her husband's abuse.5 9  Likewise, the
Washington Court of Appeals reinstated a jury verdict for a
plaintiff, awarding her $59,130 for personal injuries and denying her
husband's motion for a new trial.'
While these awards would seem to present a hopeful picture
for battered women seeking to sue their abusers, these decisions
are relatively few and far between. There are still many obstacles
for victims of domestic abuse to overcome in order to recover in
tort. Social factors make it difficult for victims to take any
affirmative action to change their situations. Even if they do
attempt to hold their abusers accountable, they face many legal
hurdles before they can even get to trial.
1. Societal Obstacles.-There are many societal pressures that
can prevent battered women from bringing charges against their
abusers.61 Many battered women hold traditional views about a
woman's role in the marital relationship and feel that they are
beaten because they have not been a "good wife., 6 2 Often these
women fear societal condemnation for accusing their husbands of
abuse.63 They may even feel guilty or ashamed that their mar-
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the marital context must be much
higher than in the ordinary context. Id. at 1326.
58. Gay v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
59. Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). The court explicitly
rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court was unable to consider a tort action in a
divorce proceeding. Id. at 940-41.
60. Beam v. Beam, 569 P.2d 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
61. In the case of husband battering, there are other societal factors preventing the
victim from bringing suit, such as fear of being exposed as "less of a man." Husband
battering, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
62. WALKER, supra note 51, at 31, 33-34. Through her extensive studies of battered
women, Dr. Walker has found that many battered women believe the notion that "a woman's
proper place is in the home" and that this contributes to the overall dynamic of domination
and control of the husband over the wife. Id. at 33-34.
63. Id. at 170. Many battered women are aware that "if they attempt to seek out help,
they must be prepared for immediate publicity, embarrassment and the potential ruination
of their husbands' careers." Id. at 167.
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riages are failing and blame themselves for such failure.' Fur-
thermore, they may perceive the battering as "normal," especially
if the victims were raised in a violent household.65
Additionally, many battered women remain in an abusive
relationship because they are economically dependent upon their
spouses,66 rendering them financially unable to leave, or they
remain because they fear for the well-being of their children.67
Moreover, many women fear that leaving will only encourage their
husbands to commit more severe violence. 6s Further compound-
ing the situation is the denial that an abusive relationship even
exists.
6 9
A battered woman's hesitation to seek help may, as well, come
from experience. Even when a battered woman is able to call the
police for help, this often proves ineffective. Some officers assign
domestic disturbance calls low priority or hesitate to respond out
of a fear for their own safety.7" Only recently have most states
allowed officers to arrest an abusive spouse where the officer
himself has not seen any physical acts of aggression, but where
probable cause existed to believe such acts had occurred.71
64. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
65. Id. at 371-72 (citing BATrERED WOMEN, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 60 (M. Roy ed. 1977)). Being raised in a violent setting also helps explain why
a husband may batter his wife. Waits, supra note 46, at 288. "In a study of men in a
Washington state abuser's program, 63% had either experienced physical abuse, or had
witnessed physical abuse involving their parents, when they were children." NATIONAL
CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, WOMEN BATTERING: THE FACTS 7 (1989)
[hereinafter NATIONAL CENTER].
66. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372. Dr. Walker describes two ways economics is used in a
battering relationship: (1) to trap the wife in marriage for fear of leaving and being poor, and
(2) to use money as a coercive weapon to maintain control over the wife. WALKER, supra
note 51, at 129-44.
While economics can be a major factor in explaining why a wife remains with her
batterer, domestic abuse is not confined to lower economic classes or economically
dependent women. Id. at 18-19. "Although some battered women are jobless, many more
are highly competent workers and successful career women. They include doctors, lawyers,
corporation executives, nurses, secretaries, full-time homemakers, and others." Id. at 19.
67. Id.
68. Waits, supra note 46, at 283. "Three-fourths of domestic assaults occur while victims
are separated or divorced from their assailants." NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 65, at 29
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT To THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE-THE
DATA 21 (1983)).
69. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372 (citing T. DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME, at 50 (1978)).
70. Sewell, supra note 37, at 1006-08.
71. James, supra note 46, at 513.
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2. Legal Obstacles.-In addition to the numerous social
factors, there are also legal obstacles that a battered woman must
overcome before she can recover in tort. While generally elimi-
nated, interspousal tort immunity is still retained in some states for
all claims arising out of a marriage. 72 In other states, the immuni-
ty still exists for specific torts, such as claims of battery and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
7
Res judicata can likewise prevent a battered woman from suing
her husband outside of marriage. In many jurisdictions, any claim
arising out of a marriage must be joined with the dissolution
proceeding or the claim is extinguished. For example, New Jersey
courts apply the "entire controversy doctrine" to marital torts.
74
In Tevis v. Tevis,75 the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
[s]ince the circumstances of the marital tort and its potential for
money damages were relevant in the matrimonial proceedings,
the claim should not have been held in abeyance; it should,
under the 'single controversy' doctrine, have been presented in
conjunction with that action as part of the overall dispute
between the parties in order to lay at rest all their legal
differences in one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and
fractionalization of litigation.76
While this doctrine is based on general conceptions of efficiency
and fairness, it can operate against a woman who has been
traumatized during an abusive marriage and is psychologically
unable to bring claims against her abuser at such an early stage."
72. Scherer, supra note 24, at 562-63.
73. Id.
74. Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979). This is also known as the "single
controversy doctrine."
75. 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979).
76. Id. at 1196. The New Jersey Superior Court stated that the effect of the "entire
controversy doctrine" was "to preclude a party from withholding from the action for separate
and later litigation a constituent component of the controversy even where that component
is a separate and independently cognizable cause of action." Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29,
32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). The Brown court created an equitable exception to the
doctrine when the conduct comprising the tort occurred during the pendency of the marital
proceeding. Id. Thus, the entire controversy doctrine applies to bar separate litigation of
claims occurring up until the institution of the dissolution proceeding.
77. In addition to not being permitted to bring marital tort actions independently, many
victims of domestic violence are also precluded from trying their claims in front of a jury.
In New Jersey, all related marital claims are resolved in the Family Part, a division of the
chancery courts, where jury trials are not allowed. Recently, however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that "when the Family Part is convinced that society's interest in
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By far, statutes of limitations pose the greatest barrier to a
woman who sues her batterer.18  Even where a claim is not
completely barred at the time of pleading, recovery is limited to the
tortious acts committed within the statutory time limit. Therefore,
a woman who has been subjected to a thirty-year marriage of
physical and mental abuse may sue only for the incidents that
would traditionally constitute a tort, and only for the acts that
happened within the statutory time limit from the date of filing suit.
The statute of limitations for all other claims will have run as soon
as the plaintiff had the right to bring an action against her
batterer.79
As in Curtis v. Firth,8" many victims of domestic abuse who
have sought recovery in tort have introduced evidence of battered
woman syndrome. In this context, the jury is instructed through
expert testimony on the dynamics of battering relationships to
explain the victim's actions, such as why she would remain in an
abusive relationship without attempting to escape. While a plaintiff
has been unable to receive compensation for the syndrome itself,
it can be used to help a jury understand the extent of her distress.
BWS evidence is also frequently used to give credibility to the
victim's behavior, which may be perceived as inconsistent with
being a victim by those on the jury who are unfamiliar with abusive
relationships. 1
Even with the assistance of BWS evidence, these civil remedies
have not gone far enough to redress the problems of domestic
vindicating a marital tort through the jury process is the dominant interest in the matter, it
may order that the marital tort be tried by a jury." Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667 (N.J.
1996). This holding expands upon Giovine, which also confronted the issue of permitting
jury trials for marital torts. 663 A.2d at 122-23 (holding that a marital tort claimant may be
entitled to a jury trial if she can establish "that the injury is serious and significant, resulting
in permanent physical or psychological injury ... [or] ... that the nature of the injury,
whether physical or psychological, requires complex medical evidence.").
While the majority's "apparent conclusion that joinder of the marital tort claim with
the divorce proceeding ordinarily should be required" leaves the entire controversy doctrine
intact, Brennan, 678 A.2d at 680 (Stein, J., dissenting), this decision exemplifies New Jersey's
continuing efforts to provide redress for victims of domestic violence.
78. For a detailed discussion of statutes of limitation, see infra part IV.
79. See Tevis, 400 A.2d at 1194 (discussing statutes of limitation).
80. 850 P.2d 749 (Idaho 1993).
81. See Joan M. Schroeder, Comment, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the
Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 IOwA L. REV. 553, 560-62 (1991) (discussing the need for expert
testimony on BWS in the prosecution of a batterer).
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abuse. As the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court
noted in Cusseaux v. Pickett,82
[a]s is the case with the domestic violence statute where existing
criminal statutes were inadequate, so too are the civil laws of
assault and battery insufficient to redress the harms suffered as
a result of domestic violence. Domestic violence is a plague on
our social structure and a frontal assault on the institution of
the family. The battered-woman's syndrome is but one of the
pernicious symptoms of that plague.'
Cusseaux, the trial level predecessor to Giovine v. Giovine,
84
held that battered woman's syndrome was an independent cause of
action.8" In reaching its decision, the court focused on the nature
of the syndrome and its psychological impact on the victim. 6 To
understand the significance of Cusseaux and Giovine, and why
BWS can be used to surmount the statute of limitations in tort, a
more in-depth examination of battered woman syndrome is
necessary.
III. Battered Woman Syndrome
A. The Syndrome
Battered Woman Syndrome is a subcategory of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder.' It is used to describe "a series of common
characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and
psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant
male figure in their lives."88 The syndrome is characterized by a
pattern of behavior known as the "cycle of violence." 9 In order
for a woman to be diagnosed as suffering from BWS, she must
have gone through this cycle at least twice.'
82. 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
83. Id. at 793.
84. 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
85. Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
86. Id. at 791-92.
87. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing battered
woman's syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder).
88. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371.
89. WALKER, supra note 51, at 55-70.
90. Id. at xv.
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Battered women include wives
or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order
19961
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The cycle of violence consists of three phases that can vary in
both time and intensity.91 The first phase is known as the "ten-
sion-building stage."92 This period is characterized by repeated
minor battering incidents, both physical and psychological, against
the woman." As the tension builds, she becomes passive and tries
to appease her partner, attempting to prevent him from exploding
into violent behavior.94 The anticipation of this violent behavior
causes severe psychological stress, often manifesting itself in
physical symptoms.
95
The second phase consists of the "acute battering incident. 96
This occurs when the tensions built up during the first phase are
released.97 The abuser's rage takes over and neither partner is
able to control the violent behavior.98 By the time composure is
regained, the woman has usually been severely beaten.99
The third phase is illustrated by "kindness and contrite loving
behavior."'" Here, the abuser realizes that he has lost control
and begs for forgiveness for his actions."' 1 He promises he will
never use physical violence again, and vows to change his behav-
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is
defined as a battered woman.
Id.
91. Id. at 55.
92. Id. at 56-59.
93. Id. at 55-59.
94. WALKER, supra note 51, at 55-59.
95. Id. at 63. Dr. Walker's studies show that a battered woman often becomes "anxious,
depressed and complains of other psychophysiological symptoms. Sleepless nights, loss of
appetite, or their opposites, overeating, oversleeping and constant fatigue are frequently
reported during this time. Many women suffer from severe tension headaches, stomach
ailments, high blood pressure, allergic skin reactions, and heart palpitations." Id. at 61.
96. Id. at 59.
97. "Phase two is characterized by the uncontrollable discharge of the tensions that have
built up during phase one. This lack of control and its major destructiveness distinguish the
acute battering incident from the minor battering incidents in phase one." Id. at 59.
98. Id. at 59-65.
99. WALKER, supra note 51, 59-65.
100. Id. at 65-70.
101. Id.
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ior.I°2 This change, however, is only temporary, and soon phase
three becomes phase one and the cycle begins anew.103
Understanding BWS and the cycle of violence can help to
explain why women remain with their abusers. The myth that
women will leave after the first instance of abuse, or conversely,
that women enjoy being beaten if they stay, has often improperly
impeached the credibility of women who remain in the relation-
ship." The third phase of the cycle reinforces a woman's belief
that her abuser can change his ways and she becomes convinced
that they can achieve a normal loving relationship. I°5 She wants
to believe him and his behavior during this phase reinforces her
hope."° Unfortunately, this usually turns out to be a false hope.
The woman's ultimate realization that she cannot control her
partner's behavior instills a feeling of helplessness and futility."°
The theory of "learned helplessness" describes how a per-
ceived feeling of helplessness can become reality.0 8 It explains
why a battered woman feels that she cannot help herself and why
she does not seek help from others. The constant physical and
mental abuse "diminishes the woman's motivation to respond.""I
The victim becomes passive and feels that nothing she does can
influence her partner or her situation.10 She further believes that
any attempt to leave will be futile.11 Consequently, she develops
a belief in the strength and omnipotence of her abuser,11 2 a belief
that is reinforced with each violent act. This leads to low-self
esteem and deep depression."13 As a result, the victim falls into
102. In this stage, the man will often "give up drinking, dating other women, visiting his
mother, or whatever else affects his internal anxiety state." Id. at 66.
There have been many studies on the effect of alcohol in a battering relationship.
While alcohol was previously thought to be the cause of domestic batteries, studies have
shown that beatings will occur whether the batterer is sober or intoxicated. Waits, supra
note 46, at 290. "His drinking may well facilitate his battering, but it is not its cause." Id.
103. WALKER, supra note 51, at 65-70.
104. See generally Schroeder, supra note 81 (discussing how evidence of BWS can explain
a battered woman's actions that a jury might otherwise consider to be inconsistent with being
a victim).
105. WALKER, supra note 51, at 67-68.
106. Id. at 67.
107. Id. at 47-50.
108. Id. at 42-54.
109. Id. at 49.
110. WALKER, supra note 51, at 50.
111. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
112. WALKER, supra note 51, at 75.
113. Id. at 50.
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a "state of psychological paralysis and become[s] unable to take
any action at all to improve or alter the situation.""' 4
Such inaction on the part of the battered woman has led to
many misconceptions about why battered women remain in an
abusive relationship. Therefore, introducing evidence of BWS is
helpful to combat these popular myths, as both juries and judges
may not understand the dynamic of a battering relationship."5
Like all expert testimony evidence, this must first satisfy the
applicable rules for admissibility.
B. Admissibility of BWS Evidence at Trial
Evidence of BWS is introduced at trial through expert witness
testimony."6 Generally, the standard for admissibility for expert
testimony is determined under the Dyas"7 test or the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' Dyas contained a three-prong test: (1)
whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony is beyond the
understanding of the average layman; (2) whether the expert is
qualified to give an opinion that will aid the trier of fact; and (3)
the state of the art or scientific knowledge permits the expert to
give a reasonable opinion.19 To meet the third prong, also
114. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
115. For example, a Vermont trial court found that a wife's claims of marital abuse were
"'blown way out of proportion as evidenced by the fact that she stayed throughout the four
years of marriage."' Blair v. Blair, 575 A.2d 191,193 (Vt. 1990) (quoting the findings of the
trial court). The Vermont Supreme Court remanded this case, noting that the wife fit the
profile of a battered woman and the trial court's findings were based on discredited myths
about battered women. Id. at 192-93.
116. The California Supreme Court recently noted that
... the preferred term among many experts today is "expert testimony on
battering and its effects" or "expert testimony on battered women's experiences."
Domestic violence experts have critiqued the phrase "battered women's
syndrome" because (1) it implies that there is one syndrome which all battered
women develop, (2) it has pathological connotations which suggest that battered
women suffer from sort of sickness, (3) expert testimony on domestic violence
refers to more than women's psychological reactions to violence, (4) it focuses
attention on the battered woman rather than on the batterer's coercive and
controlling behavior and (5) it creates an image of battered women as suffering
victims rather than as active survivors.
People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996) (quoting amici curiae California Alliance
Against Domestic Violence et al.).
117. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1997).
118. FED. R. EviD. 702.
119. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (construing Dyas,
376 A.2d 827).
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known as the Frye" or "general acceptance" test, the evi-
dence sought to be admitted must be shown to have general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.22
In contrast, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 eliminates the Frye
test from the requirement for admissibility. Instead, it permits
expert testimony on a subject if the testimony will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence."2 In 1993, The United States
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals124
declared that the Frye test was superseded by Federal Rule
702.11 Many state courts, including New Jersey, have also
replaced the Frye test with the more liberal standard articulated in
Rule 702.'26
State v. Kelly127 was the first case to hold that BWS evidence
could pass the more rigorous Frye test. In Kelly, the defendant was
an abused wife who murdered her husband."2  BWS evidence
was introduced to bolster her claim of self-defense by explaining
her constant fear and why she remained in an abusive mar-
riage. 129 This evidence was introduced to show the reasonable-
ness of her perception of immediate danger.13 °  Although not
120. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923).
121. Schroeder, supra note 81, at 562.
122. The Frye Court noted:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
123. Rule 702 states that
[ilf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
124. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
125. The Third Circuit was the first circuit to abandon the Frye test for Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
126. New Jersey has rejected the "general acceptance" test for the Third Circuit's
approach which is drawn from Rule 702. Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733
(N.J. 1991). N.J. R. EVID. 702.
127. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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making a conclusive ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that BWS had a sufficient scientific basis to produce reliable
results.31 The majority of states that have dealt with this issue
have since followed New Jersey's lead and have declared BWS to
be admissible scientific evidence of a psychological or medical
condition.132
While not a defense in itself, BWS evidence is used to show
the reasonableness of a woman's actions. 33 This evidence cannot
be introduced to show that a defendant was not responsible for her
actions, but instead that it was reasonable for her to believe that
she was in imminent danger.134 In a case factually analogous to
131. The Court noted:
[T~he record before us reveals that the battered woman's syndrome has a sufficient
scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results as required by
State v. Cavallo, and Evid R. 56(2). The numerous books, articles, and papers...
indicate the presence of a growing field of study and research about the battered
woman's syndrome and recognition of the syndrome in the scientific field.
Id. at 380.
For cases discussing BWS evidence as being "beyond the understanding of the average
layman," see Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981) (holding that BWS evidence was
admissible because jurors would not ordinarily understand a battered woman's actions); Ibn-
Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (holding that BWS evidence should have
been allowed because it was beyond the understanding of the average layman); State v.
Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993) (holding that the Frye test was inapplicable to BWS
testimony and BWS was beyond the experience of the average juror).
132. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 968 (Pa. 1991) (Cappy, J., concurring).
BWS has gained such popular acceptance that its exclusion from a woman's defense at trial
has been held to be ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555
A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989). Since BWS has received recognition as a medical condition, many
women who have been convicted of killing their abusers and who did not introduce BWS
testimony at trial have been given a second chance. Statistics from the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women show that seventy-two women from
eleven states have been granted clemency since 1990. M. A. Stapleton, Battered Woman's
Advocate Downplays Setback, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 9, 1995, at 1.
BWS evidence has also been used in custody cases. See In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d
326 (W. Va. 1988) (using BWS to explain the mother's failure to protect the child from her
husband's abuse); R.H. v. B.F., 653 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (using BWS to refute
the husband's contention that the wife was the abusive partner); see also Knock v. Knock,
621 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1993) (using BWS to show that the husband had been abusive toward
the wife).
133. "[Battered woman's syndrome] is some evidence to be considered to support a
defense, such as self-defense, duress, compulsion, and coercion.... Such evidence is used by
the jury to understand the defendant's actions, and goes to her state of mind." United States
v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501, 1505-06 (D. Kan. 1995). See also People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d
758, 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
134. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Most recently, the California Supreme Court held that BWS evidence was relevant and
admissible to show the objective reasonableness of the defendant's belief that she was in
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Kelly, Chief Justice Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
in a concurring opinion that
traditional concepts of self-defense do not include this particular
cycle of behavior [of the battering relationship], but instead
focuses [sic] on the immediacy of the perceived harm rather
than the systematic and cumulative damage inflicted on the
abused individual. Tailoring self-defense claims to recognize the
'battered woman syndrome' would thus be an effective means
of finally providing legal protection for a woman forced to
defend herself from further attack.'35
Battered woman's syndrome evidence has been extremely
useful in supporting a claim of self-defense when a woman kills her
batterer in retaliation. By introducing evidence of BWS to
corroborate a self-defense claim, evidence of the batterer's history
of violent conduct will be admitted. This evidence is further
helpful to the defense, not only because it goes to show the
defendant's knowledge of the prior violent character of her abuser,
but also because it helps to buttress the assertion that he was
actually the aggressor.
136
imminent danger. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). The court echoed the
reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court, declaring that "'the expert's testimony might
also enable the jury to find that the battered [woman] ... is particularly able to predict
accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her. That conclusion could
significantly affect the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant's fear for her
life."' Id. at 9 (quoting State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984)). The Humphrey court
also found that evidence of BWS was relevant to support the defendant's credibility. Id. at
9-10.
135. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. 1991) (Nix, C. J., concurring).
136. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that evidence of the abuser's violent
conduct is relevant to show that defendant was put in fear and therefore her actions were
reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 964. The court also held that this could further
buttress her self-defense claim by showing that the decedent was the aggressor. Id. at 965.
Battered woman's syndrome evidence has also been used to bolster other defenses
such as duress, compulsion or coercion. See United States v. Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501 (D.
Kan. 1995) (holding that evidence of BWS met the standards for admissibility and was
relevant to support the defense claim of compulsion).
For an example of the unsuccessful use of BWS evidence relating to the defense of
compulsion, see People v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d 1259 (11. App. Ct. 1993). In that case, the
defendant was convicted of force-feeding her three-month old baby sulfuric acid as part of
a fraudulent products liability scheme against a baby-formula manufacturer. She claimed
that she was suffering from BWS and acting under compulsion from her husband. In its
findings, the trial court reported that it Was "aware" of the effects of BWS and the
compulsion of her husband, but sentenced the defendant to sixty years due to the seriousness
of the crime. Id. at 1266.
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Criminal prosecutors have also made extensive use of BWS
evidence. It has been frequently used in rape trials to enhance the
victim's credibility. For example, in State v. Frost,'37 the defen-
dant tried to show that the victim consented to sex because she
voluntarily remained with the defendant for the rest of the day
following the rape and did not immediately seek help.'38 The
state offered expert testimony on BWS to explain the victim's
actions and to bolster her credibility.'39 Over the defendant's
objections, the court held that the evidence regarding BWS was
admissible, stating:
It would seem anomalous to allow a battered woman, where she
is a criminal defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in
order to help the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny
her that same opportunity when she is the complaining witness
and/or victim and her abuser is the criminal defendant."4°
While BWS evidence has been used effectively in assisting the
credibility and defense of victims, it has not been employed on the
same scale in civil cases. Even though BWS is used to explain why
the victim stays with her abuser and does not seek help, courts
have been loath to consider BWS when applying the statute of
limitations. The statute has thus barred many victims of domestic
violence from seeking recovery for the injuries that were caused by
the abuse.
137. 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
138. Id. at 1288.
139. Id. at 1286-88.
140. Id. at 1287. In a similar rape case, the defendant argued that the victim's actions
were inconsistent with someone who had been raped because she remained in the
relationship with defendant and failed to report the rapes immediately after they happened.
State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988). The Supreme Court of Washington held that
evidence of BWS is admissible to explain the defendant's actions and to dispel the common
myth that rape victims always complain immediately to authorities. Id. at 1171-72. The
court noted that unless a juror was involved in a battering relationship, the juror could easily
misunderstand the victim's response. Id. at 1170-71. The court also described a typical
response to battering as being characterized by "overwhelming terror, shame, and guilt, as
well as condemnation due to their inability to leave the situation." Id. at 1170 (citing Ferraro
& Johnson, How Women Experience Battering: The Process of Victimization, 30 Soc. PROBS.
325 (1983)). See also Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1990) (using BWS
to explain why victim recanted her police statement at trial). But see State v. Ellis, 656 A.2d
25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (reversing trial court because jury was improperly
instructed on the limited use of BWS evidence).
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IV. Discussion: Statute of Limitations
The underlying purpose behind statutes of limitations lies in
the desire to settle disputes quickly and efficiently. 4' By barring
stale claims, courts encourage claims to be brought swiftly in order
to "avoid the unfairness and injustice which stem from litigation
based on distant circumstances and faded memories."1 42  The
statute thus protects defendants who would be unable to properly
defend themselves in situations where witnesses have disappeared
and evidence has been lost with the passage of time.
The specific number of years in which a plaintiff has to file a
lawsuit is mandated by statutes in most states,143 but the exact
time at which a cause of action accrues is usually left to judicial
determination. l" Usually, accrual is determined by the date of
the last wrongful act.145 Once a cause of action is determined to
have accrued, the statute begins to run.1 6
The most obvious effect that statutes of limitation can have is
the denial of access to the courts.147 Since mechanistic application
of the statute can result in injustice and unnecessary harm to
plaintiffs, courts and legislatures have been willing to create
equitable exceptions to the statute.148 These exceptions toll the
statute of limitations for a reasonable period of time under certain
circumstances.
A plaintiff's insanity or duress can be used to toll the statute
in some states. 49  In New Jersey, for example, it is statutorily
141. DAN DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 297 (2d ed. 1993).
142. Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1194 (N.J. 1979) (citing Kaczmarek v. New Jersey
Turnpike Auth., 390 A.2d 597 (N.J. 1978)). Another policy reason behind statutes of
limitations is certainty. DOBBS, supra note 141, at 312. Once the statutory period has run,
a person or entity could be sure that no charges would be filed against it. Id. This is
especially important to insurance companies who would have to raise premiums to cover the
possibility of future lawsuits against them. Id.
143. Norrie Clevenger, Note, Statute of Limitations: Childhood Victims of Sexual Abuse
Bringing Actions Against Their Perpetrators After Attaining the Age of Majority, 30 J. FAM.
L. 447, 453-54 (1991).
144. Tevis, 400 A.2d at 1194.
145. Clevenger, supra note 143, at 453-54.
146. Id. at 453.
147. Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
148. Id.
149. In the first New Jersey case to hold that a plaintiff's insanity could toll the statute
of limitations, the plaintiff broke her hip when she fell on an icy sidewalk on the defendant's
premises. Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 207 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1965). She failed to
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mandated that the statute of limitations is tolled for a plaintiff who
is insane at the time the cause of action accrues,150 and the statute
begins to run when the plaintiff regains sanity.151 Some states,
however, do not allow the statute to be tolled for any disability.
1 52
Yet, when a mental impairment makes it difficult or impossible
to be aware of one's cause of action, a plaintiff can not be said to
have "slept on [her] rights." '153 Therefore, it would be manifestly
unjust to apply the statute in these circumstances. Likewise, when
a plaintiff is placed under such duress by the defendant that she
feels unable to bring an action expeditiously, it would contravene
public policy to punish the plaintiff for not doing what she
perceived to be an impossible task.1" In this respect, a plaintiff's
mental state is used to toll the statute. Courts are increasingly
willing to toll the limitations period when rigid application would
"'inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs'
without materially advancing the objectives they are designed to
serve." 155  It was this policy that prompted the Giovine court to
create an equitable exception for battered woman's syndrome.
bring an action within the two year statute of limitations, but claimed that this was because
she developed a mental disability as a direct result of her injury. Id. Since her injury and
consequential insanity were due to the negligence of the defendant, she claimed that the
statute should be tolled until the time her sanity was restored. Id. at 517. The New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized that her inability to file suit was attributable to defendant's act,
and the court created an equitable exception to the statute. Id. at 519. The court held that
"a defendant whose negligent act brings about plaintiff's insanity should not be permitted
to cloak himself with the protective garb of the statute of limitations." Id. at 519.
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-21 (West 1987). For examples of other states that toll the
statute of limitations for insanity, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-106 (1980); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 208 (Consol. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-36
(1992).
151. "'[I]nsane' in the statute of limitations means such a condition of mental
derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or
instituting legal action." Kyle, 207 A.2d at 521.
152. See Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law to
forbid the tolling of the statute of limitations for insanity). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5533(a).
153. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971).
154. Tolling the statute of limitations for a plaintiff's duress is usually limited to the
situation where the plaintiffs duress is part of the underlying cause of action. Jones v. Jones,
576 A.2d 316, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). See also Overall v. Klotz, 846 F. Supp.
297, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
155. Jones, 576 A.2d at 320 (quoting Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., Inc., 412 A.2d
122, 124 (N.J. 1980)).
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A. Giovine and Domestic Abuse: Continuous Tort Doctrine
Since battered woman's syndrome has gained scientific
acceptance, some women have used it to recover under traditional
tort law.1 56 These claims, however, were predicated upon specific
acts of tortious conduct that occurred within the statute of
limitations. Despite the recognition of BWS as a medical condi-
tion, women have traditionally been unable to receive compensa-
tion for the condition itself.
It is in this regard that Giovine v. Giovine becomes so
significant. It was the first case to hold that a plaintiff could
recover for the syndrome itself. Consequently, the plaintiff was
allowed to seek compensation for the years of abuse that contribut-
ed to her present medical condition. 15 7  To prove that she was
suffering from BWS, the plaintiff would be allowed to introduce the
many instances of abuse which occurred from the beginning of the
relationship.158  This abusive conduct would be likened to a
"continuous tort," and the statute of limitations would be tolled
until the last battering incident occurred. 59
Giovine has its roots in Cusseaux v. Pickett, the first civil case
in New Jersey to recognize BWS.1 °  In Cusseaux, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had committed numerous acts of "abuse
and violence" against her during their ten-year relationship.
1 61
The violence was so severe that she had to seek medical treatment
on several occasions.16' The plaintiff claimed that she suffered
156. For a discussion on traditional civil remedies, see supra part II.C.
157. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
158. Id. at 119. "[Iln order to prove the medical condition of battered woman's
syndrome, plaintiff must be permitted to prove all acts of physical or psychological
misconduct." Id.
159. Id. at 118. The plaintiff would be able to introduce evidence of all the prior
batterings including the first to establish the continual nature of the abuse. She would be
able to receive compensation for all of the batteries except the first. Due to the cyclical
nature of BWS, a woman cannot be said to be suffering from the condition until she goes
through the cycle twice. See supra part III.A.
160. Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
161. Id. at 790.
162. Id. The plaintiff alleged that she was beaten with defendant's fists, and was struck
with many objects including a heavy kitchen pot, an unidentified object, a large corningware
dish, and a gallon container of Clorox bleach. Id. at 790 n.1. She also alleged that she
received many injuries, such as a broken nose, and that she had to seek treatment at three
separate hospital emergency rooms. Id.
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from the medical condition of battered woman's syndrome as a
result of the defendant's physical and emotional abuse." 3
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court
recognized BWS as an independent cause of action under New
Jersey law."6 The court therefore created an equitable exception
to the statute of limitations for victims of domestic abuse. As the
court stated:
It would be contrary to the public policy of this State, not to
mention cruel, to limit recovery to only those individual
incidents of assault and battery for which the applicable statute
of limitations has not yet run. The mate who is responsible for
creating the condition suffered by the battered victim must be
made to account for his actions-all of his actions. Failure to
allow affirmative recovery under these circumstances would be
tantamount to the courts condoning the continued abusive
treatment of women in the domestic sphere. This the courts
cannot and will never do.'65
On appeal, the plaintiff in Giovine argued that the trial court
erred both by not following Cusseaux and by striking the claims
based on domestic abuse that fell outside of the statute of limita-
tions."6  The plaintiff claimed that the pattern of violence she
163. Id. at 790.
164. Id. at 793. The court enumerated specific elements of the new tort:
The plaintiff must show 1) involvement in a marital or marital-like intimate
relationship; and 2) physical or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant
partner to the relationship over an extended period of time; and 3) the aforestated
abuse has caused recurring physical or psychological injury over the course of the
relationship; and 4) a past or present inability to take any action to improve or
alter the situation unilaterally.
Id. at 793-94.
The court also explicitly stated that this new cause of action was not limited to women
or traditional heterosexual relationships. Id. at 794 n.7.
165. Cusseaux, 652 A. 2d at 794.
166. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 113. The Giovine court noted that the lower court was not
bound by Cusseaux because it was a court of collateral jurisdiction, but the lower court failed
to consider the New Jersey Legislature's policy statement in the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act. Id. at 117 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 1995)). The
Act's legislative findings state in pertinent part:
it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims of violence that occurs in a
family or family-like setting by providing access to both emergent and long-term
civil and criminal remedies and sanctions, and by ordering those remedies and
sanctions that are available to assure the safety of the victims and the public. To
that end, the Legislature encourages ... the broad application of the remedies
available under this act in the civil and criminal courts of this State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 1995).
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experienced constituted a continuous tort sufficient to toll the
statute.167  The Appellate Division, while agreeing with
Cusseaux's premise, held that BWS does not constitute a continu-
ous tort in and of itself, but that it is the medical condition
resulting from a pattern of abuse which constitutes the tort.' 68
The court declared that the plaintiff must show that the conduct
leading to the condition of BWS must be considered the continuous
tort. 69 While this seems to have limited the Cusseaux decision,
the Giovine court noted that its disagreement was predicated upon
semantics."
As the dissent in Giovine correctly noted, the majority had
created a new cause of action for BWS.171  If a woman seeks
recovery for damages attributable to the syndrome, she will be
permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior abusive
behavior. This evidence will support her claim and show that the
defendant's conduct was sufficient to cause the plaintiff's condition.
By allowing the plaintiff to recover for the history of violence
under the name of the syndrome, the pattern of abuse will be
necessarily considered a continuous tort. Because BWS, by its very
nature, is the result of continuous and prolonged abuse, 172 when
the plaintiff receives compensation for the syndrome, she simulta-
neously receives compensation for the history of abuse that caused
it.' 7' Taking the nature of the syndrome into consideration, a
167. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 113.
168. Id. at 115.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 114. As the court stated:
[p]laintiff shall be entitled to sue her husband for damages attributable to his
continuous tortious conduct resulting in her present psychological condition,
provided she has medical, psychiatric, or psychological expert proof to establish
that she was caused to have an inability "to take any action at all to improve or
alter her situation."
Id. at 117 (quoting Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 792).
171. Id. at 124-30 (Skillman, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Skillman commented
that "[the majority's discussion of the question whether battered woman's syndrome is a
continuous tort is confusing and contradictory." Id. at 128. He noted that "[i]t is inadvisable
to create new causes of action in tort in advance of any necessity for doing so in order to
achieve a just result." Id. at 125 (quoting Neelthak Dev. Corp. v. Township of Gloucester,
639 A.2d 1141, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)). In his view, the existing tort causes
of action are sufficient to compensate victims of domestic violence and the majority's
creation of a new cause of action could be used to improperly "extend marital tort liability
to conduct that would not give rise to legal liability in other contexts," such as verbal abuse.
Id. at 126.
172. See supra part III.A.
173. See supra note 159.
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holding that the conduct that caused the condition constitutes a
continuous tort seems only logical.
1. Continuous Tort Doctrine.-A continuous tort is "one
inflicted over a period of time; it involves wrongful conduct that is
repeated until desisted.. . . A continuing tort sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not
by continual ill effects from an original violation."174 Thus, the
cause of action for a continuous tort does not accrue until the
tortious conduct ceases.175 This doctrine is usually applied where
each contributing incident is insufficient to constitute an individual
cause of action, but it has also been applied to a continuous pattern
of illegal acts.176 Generally, it is the cumulative effect of the
defendant's conduct that forms the basis of recovery. 77
The continuous tort doctrine has been applied to expand the
statute of limitations in many different scenarios.1 78  In Page v.
United States,'179 an army veteran sued the Veterans Administra-
tion (VA) for injuries he suffered after receiving allegedly negligent
medical treatment at a VA hospital.1"° He claimed that he was
wrongly prescribed harmful addictive drugs without being properly
monitored by the hospital, and that this caused him "severe
physical and mental injury.'' 81  Since it would be unrealistic to
view each prescription as a separate and actionable injury, the court
held that the cumulative effect of the treatment was a continuous
174. Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d at 749, 754 (Idaho 1993) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of
Actions § 177, at 231 (1987)).
175. "It is well-settled that '[w]hen a tort involves continuing injury, the cause of action
accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct ceases."'
Id. at 754 (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
176. See Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 (E.D. Va. 1973).
177. Curtis, 850 P.2d at 754 (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
178. See Creswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Scoggins, 39 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897)
(applying concept of continuous tort to trespass to land and nuisance); Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff's exposure to
asbestos is a continuing tort); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 546 A.2d 570 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding that continuous presence of toxic waste and resultant
hazardous byproducts is a continuous tort); Bustamento v. J.D. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La.
1992) (holding that sexual harassment in the workplace was a continuous tort).
179. Page, 729 F.2d at 818.
180. Id. at 819.
181. Id.
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tort.1 82 Therefore, the cause of action against the VA hospital
accrued when the plaintiff received his last prescription.
' 83
A continuous tort is not limited to a pattern of acts that would
be insufficient, in and of themselves, to form separate causes of
action. In Landman v. Royster,18  the conduct forming the
continuous tort consisted of "six years of arbitrary, illegal and
unjust treatment.' ' 85 The plaintiff, a prison inmate, was subjected
to prolonged solitary confinement and constant abuses and
degradations by prison officials in retaliation for assisting other
inmates in filing legal petitions.86 The court found that he had
suffered "severe psychic and physical injuries" from this pattern of
treatment.187 Noting that each illegal incident contributed to the
plaintiff's present medical condition, the court granted him relief on
the cumulative effect of the illegal treatment. ' 88 The court stated:
"[W]hen injury is caused cumulatively by a continuing wrong, the
statute of limitations begins to run when the wrongful action
ceases." '89  Thus, the plaintiff was not barred by the statute of
limitations, and he received compensation for the acts of the prison
guards that were inflicted beyond the statutory period, even though
each incident may have been independently actionable.
Similarly, some of the defendant's acts constituting the
continuous tort in Giovine may have been sufficient to form
independent claims of action.1" This, however, was irrelevant to
182. Id. at 822-23.
183. Id. at 823. While basing its holding on the premise that each individual act was
insufficient to form an actionable claim in itself, the Page court did not limit its decision to
this scenario. "Since usually no single incident can 'fairly or realistically be identified as the
cause of significant harm,' it seems proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as
actionable." Id. at 821-22 (quoting Fowkes v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 264 F.2d 397, 399 (3d
Cir. 1959) (emphasis added)). But see Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978) (refusing
to find a continuous tort because each contributing abusive act was separately actionable).
184. 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
185. Id. at 1315.
186. Id. at 1305-07.
187. Id. at 1307.
188. Id. at 1315.
189. Landman, 354 F. Supp. at 1315.
190. The court noted that absent expert proof, "the wife cannot be deemed to be
suffering from battered woman's syndrome, and each act of abuse during the marriage would
constitute a separate and distinct cause of action in tort, subject to the statute of limitations."
Giovine, 663 A.2d at 114 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2 (West 1987) and Laughlin
v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480, 483-83 (La. Ct. App. 1987)). The plaintiff's counterclaim referred
to "a continuous and unbroken wrong" without specifying specific assaults or batteries except
for the first battery. Id. at 112. This first battery is admissible to prove BWS, but it is not
compensable. See supra note 159.
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the court's analysis; instead, the court focused on the cumulative
effect of the treatment. Since the plaintiff sought recovery directly
for the syndrome, the continuous tort could comprise all of the
defendant's abusive acts that helped create her condition.' 9 '
2. Domestic Violence.-The allegation that a pattern of
domestic abuse constitutes a continuous tort has been attempted in
a few jurisdictions, although most of these attempts have met with
little success.'92 In Laughlin v. Breaux,93 the plaintiff alleged
that she suffered from battered woman's syndrome as a result of
her boyfriend's physical and mental abuse, and that this conduct
formed a continuous tort. 94 Admitting that all of the defendant's
actions helped to form her BWS, the court nevertheless refused to
find that the pattern of abuse constituted a continuous tort. 95
The court also did not find that the plaintiff's condition rendered
her unable to file suit within the statute of limitations.9 6
A District of Columbia trial court was asked to recognize a
separate independent tort of "spouse abuse" in de la Croix de
Lafayette.9 7  The court refused to do so, holding that existing
causes of action are sufficient to redress domestic abuse.198
Stressing the need for finality in the context of marital discord, 99
191. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 119.
192. See Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). The Texas Court
of Appeals recognized that negligent infliction of emotional distress by a husband against his
wife could constitute a continuous tort in order to extend the statute of limitations in a
divorce action. The court affirmed an award of $15,000 based on her husband's continual
course of conduct throughout the marriage. Id.
By the time this case reached the Supreme Court of Texas, however, the supreme
court had already refused to recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (Comyn, J., opinion). Since the plaintiff's
original pleading stated only a general claim of emotional duress, the appellate court's
decision was reversed because the decision was based specifically on negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993). The supreme
court, in the interest of justice, remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to bring a claim
under intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 626. While the appellate court's
holding that the husband's conduct formed a continuous tort presented a hopeful picture for
victims of long-term domestic violence, the supreme court never discussed this issue.
193. Laughlin, 515 So. 2d 480.
194. Id. at 482.
195. Id. at 482-83.
196. Id. at 482.
197. de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501
(D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. Aug 14, 1989).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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the court stated that "the decision to divorce or not should be
made in an environment as free of extraneous financial and fault
considerations as possible."2°°
In Curtis v. Firth,"° the defendant's pattern of domestic
abuse was found not to constitute a continuous tort in and of itself.
However, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the conduct
underlying the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was a continuous tort. 2 While the court allowed recov-
ery, it did not go so far as to create a new cause of action for
domestic abuse. 3
The reasoning used in Curtis is similar to that employed by the
New Jersey Appellate Division in Giovine. In both cases, the court
focused on the defendant's conduct and held that it formed a
continuous tort. Since the abusive conduct was considered a
continuous tort, the plaintiffs could receive compensation for their
present medical conditions that resulted from the long-term mental
and physical abuse. However, while it may appear that the
plaintiff's recovery is the same whether it is pleaded as intentional
infliction of emotional distress as in Curtis, or under the Giovine
BWS tort, this is not the case. Recovery under the Giovine
rationale goes much further in compensating the plaintiff for the
entire pattern of abuse predicating the injury.
The difference between the Giovine BWS tort and intentional
infliction of emotional distress lies in more than just the recognition
of battered woman's syndrome as the object of recovery. Inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is a completely different cause
of action and the method of recovery and objects of compensation
are computed differently. A claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must always be accompanied by some sort of
physical injury,' except where the defendant's conduct was
200. Id.
201. 850 P.2d 749 (Idaho 1993).
202. Id In upholding the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court commented on the
plaintiff's use of BWS evidence at trial. The evidence supported plaintiff's allegations of
abuse and further helped to prove the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 757.
203. Id.
204. "Normally, severe emotional distress is accompanied or followed by shock, illness
or other bodily harm, which in itself affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965). Therefore, although physical injury
is not required, it is a guarantee that the claim is bona fide. Without physical injury,
intentional infliction of emotional distress is extremely difficult to prove. Consequently, "iun
the great majority of the cases allowing recovery the genuineness of the mental disturbance
19961
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extraordinarily outrageous.2 5 Therefore, the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress must be pleaded with, and in
relation to, another intentional tort claim in the vast majority of
instances.2" It is this other intentional tort claim that must fall
within the statute of limitations. Thus, if a plaintiff suffers from
emotional distress based on a twenty year marriage of constant
battering, she may claim intentional infliction of emotional distress
only for those few batteries that occurred within the statute of
limitations. Recovery for her condition would be allocated and
apportioned only to those few batteries.
Furthermore, if the victim has a preexisting condition, such as
BWS, she cannot recover for the aggravation of her condition
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
outrageousness of a defendant's conduct is judged against a
reasonableness standard.2 7 This means that numerous instances
of abusive conduct that are not sufficiently "outrageous" by them-
selves but accumulate to cause severe emotional distress are not
compensable.2 8
In contrast, when a plaintiff sues under the Giovine rationale,
she may recover for the present medical condition that is a result
of the history of abuse suffered, including even those intentional
tortsthat occurred outside the statute of limitations. This recovery
will not be apportioned merely to the batteries that occurred within
the limitations period, but for the entire history of abuse that
contributed to the formation of the syndrome. Therefore, recovery
has been evidenced by resulting physical illness of a serious character, and both the mental
and the physical elements have been compensated." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 at 64 (5th ed. 1984).
205. "Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible grounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
206. Torts usually pleaded along with intentional infliction of emotional distress are
"assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, or the like." Id. at cmt. b.
207. "Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
'Outrageous!"' Id. at cmt. d (emphasis added).
208. If, however, the defendant knows that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to
emotional distress and his actions are likely to cause harm, his conduct will more likely be
regarded as outrageous. Id. at cmt. f. "It must be emphasized again, however, that major
outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will
regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough." Id.
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can be much greater under the Giovine BWS tort than under the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In addition, many jurisdictions do not even recognize the claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress under certain
circumstances. 2°  For example, in Pickering v. Pickering,210 the
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the tort was unavailable
when it was predicated on conduct that led to divorce.211 Other
jurisdictions that allow this cause of action require a much higher
threshold in the context of marriage. For example, in Hakkila v.
Hakkila,212 a woman claimed intentional infliction of emotional
distress for her husband's mental and physical abuses. 213 The
court rejected the claim because the husband's actions did not meet
the elevated standard of outrageousness appropriate for claims
arising out of a marriage. 14
It is apparent that even if a plaintiff can state a valid claim
under existing law, receiving even minimal compensation is far
from a certainty. No matter what cause of action is asserted, the
statute of limitations remains the single greatest bar to recovery,
indiscriminately extinguishing any claim that falls outside of the
applicable time period. Recognizing that a strict application of the
statute impedes judicial access, many courts have created narrow
exceptions to the limitations period. One of the most well-known
examples can be seen in child sexual abuse cases where the victim
psychologically repressed his or her memories of the abuse.
B. Repressed Memory Syndrome: The Discovery Rule
1. Discovery Rule.-The discovery rule, like the continuous
tort doctrine, is an equitable exception to the statute of limitations.
It is invoked to toll the statute until the plaintiff "discovers, or by
an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have
discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.
215
This rule "eases the unconscionable result to innocent victims who
209. Pennsylvania, for example, has not formally recognized intentional infliction of
emotional distress at all. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has merely acknowledged it
without adopting it. Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, 527 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1987).
210. 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989).
211. Id. at 761.
212. 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). See supra text accompanying note 57.
213. Id. at 1322.
214. Id. at 1327.
215. Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (N.J. 1973).
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by exercising even the highest degree of care could not have
discovered the cited wrong.
2 16
The rule was first recognized in New Jersey in, 1961 in
Fernandi v. Strully2 17 as applied to foreign object medical mal-
practice actions. Since then, "subsequent decisions have gone much
further and have acknowledged the relevance of the doctrine
whenever equity and justice have seemed to call for its applica-
tion. '  In further expanding the rule, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Lopez v. Swyer219 noted that courts applying the rule
should balance the unfairness to the plaintiff in denying access to
the courts with the unfairness in requiring the defendant to defend
against a stale claim.22
This rule has been extended to cases where adult survivors of
child sexual abuse have psychologically repressed the memories of
their abuse. It is not until these victims undergo counseling that
they become aware of the lost memories. Because they had not
discovered that they had a cause of action until it was already
barred, many courts use the discovery rule to allow victims the
chance to sue their abusers for the mental distress caused by the
abuse.
2. Repressed Memory Syndrome.-Many victims of child
sexual abuse repress memories of the abuse from their conscious-
216. Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 871 (Ohio 1994). See also Oliver v. Kaiser
Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio 1983) ("By focusing on discovery as
the element which triggers the statute of limitations, the discovery rule gives those injured
adequate time to seek relief on the merits without undue prejudice to defendants.").
217. 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961). In this case, a wing-nut from a medical instrument was
negligently left inside the plaintiffs abdomen during an operation. Id. The plaintiff was
unaware of the object, which was part of a medical instrument, but suffered considerable
pain for years after the operation. Id. The wing-nut was not discovered until an X-ray was
taken after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 278.
218. Lopez, 300 A.2d at 566.
219. 300 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1973).
220. Id. at 567. But see Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979). In Tevis, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the discovery rule could not be used to save a plaintiff's
claim against her husband. The court applied the statute of limitations strictly to bar her
claims for the abuse she suffered throughout her marriage. The plaintiff argued that because
interspousal tort immunity still existed when she was divorced, she had no cause of action
at that time. The court invalidated the immunity in Small v. Rockfield, 330 A.2d 335 (N.J.
1974), and this is when the plaintiff claimed she discovered that she had a cause of action.
Tevis, 400 A.2d at 1194. Even though she filed within the statutory time from the decision
in Small v. Rockfield, and only six weeks past the limitations period as calculated from her
divorce, the majority did not apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Id.
at 1197 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 101:1
1996] TOLLING THE STATUTE FOR BATTERED WOMEN
ness as part of a psychological coping mechanism.22 The memo-
ries are buried in an attempt to disassociate themselves from the
traumatic event.2' The repression can have serious psychological
effects that can last throughout adulthood.2" This phenomenon
is known as repressed memory syndrome (RMS), and like BWS, it
is a subcategory of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.224
The effects of post traumatic stress disorder explain why adult
survivors of child sexual abuse do not readily seek treatment even
after they discover that the abuse took place.22  Often, the
221. Harshaw, supra note 12, at 756.
222. Naomi Berkowitz, Note, Balancing the Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule:
Some Victims of Incestuous Abuse Are Denied Access to Washington Courts-Tyson v. Tyson,
10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 721 (1987).
Simply put, something happens that is so shocking that the mind grabs hold of the
memory and pushes it underground, into some inaccessible corner of the
unconscious. There it sleeps for years, or even decades, or even forever-isolated
from the rest of mental life. Then, one day, it may rise up and emerge into
consciousness. Repression of traumatic memories keeps painful or unacceptable
ideas, impulses, and feelings out of conscious awareness and 'enables the victim
to survive by controlling thoughts and feelings to the point at which there is no
recognition of victimization.' Recall of such memories can be triggered by
psychotherapy, hypnosis, sodium pentothal, or events completely unrelated to
therapy.
Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony or Repressed Memory, 28 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1353-54 (1995) (quoting Berkowitz, supra, at 729).
223. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of
Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 199,207-10 (1995).
224. Harshaw, supra note 12, at 756. Despite its growing acceptance by courts, repressed
memory syndrome has not been universally recognized by the psychiatric community as
reliable. See Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Comment, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility:
A Call For Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in SexualAbuse
Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 494-514 (1995).
Recently, there have been lawsuits against therapists alleging that they implanted
"false memories" of child abuse in their patients. See Tuman v. Genesis Assoc., 894 F. Supp.
183 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that parents' claims against therapist for implanting false
memories of parents involvement in satanic rituals, murders, and incest in their daughter
were sufficient to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss); Sullivan v. Cheshier, 846 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. II. 1994) (holding that parents' claims against therapist for implanting false
memories of sibling's sexual abuse in their daughter were sufficient to withstand the
defendant's motion to dismiss).
225. Harshaw, supra note 12, at 757. When a child is sexually abused by an adult, there
are a combination of factors that prevent the child from escaping the abuse or seeking help.
The abusers usually demand that the victims keep the events secret. Tyson v. Tyson, 727
P.2d 226, 234 (Wash. 1986) (Pearson, J. dissenting). This forces the victims to deal with the
situation alone, which can result in internalization of "her self-blame, anger, fears, confusion,
and sadness resulting from the incest." Id.
Moreover, children are taught to view adults as authority figures, and by being forced
to engage in sexual acts with an adult, the child's sense of right and wrong is confused.
Harshaw, supra note 12, at 756-57. "It is fundamental that in order for a person to take
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victims may blame themselves for the abuse, fear the consequences
of public exposure, or think that they will not be believed.226 In
addition, they may fear retaliation by their abusers.227 These
reasons, which parallel many of the same reasons that prevent
women suffering from BWS from seeking help, make it difficult, if
not impossible, for child sexual abuse victims to file claims within
the applicable statute of limitations.
The first case to consider the applicability of the discovery rule
to child sexual abuse was Tyson v. Tyson. 28  The plaintiff was
between three and eleven years old when she was allegedly sexually
abused by her father,229 but she claimed that she had completely
repressed the memories of the abuse until she received psychologi-
cal therapy at the age of twenty-six.23 0  Within the statutory time
period of this discovery, she filed suit. 3
Relying on the policy behind the statute and the possible
unfairness to the defendant, the Washington Supreme Court
refused to toll the statute of limitations. 3 2 The court stated that
the discovery rule was not applicable to repressed memory
syndrome cases because there was no objective evidence to support
the plaintiff's claim of abuse. 3  The state's statutory provisions
that allowed child sexual abuse victims three years beyond the age
of majority to sue their abusers were deemed to strike the proper
balance between the plaintiff's right to bring an action and the
prevention of spurious claims. 34
action for a wrong, that person must perceive it as wrong." Id. at 757. Also, a significant
number of victims of child sexual abuse are abused by a relative or close personal friend.
Id. at 756. Many times the adult will tell the child that the abuse is a normal expression of
love. Id. at 757. This abuse "twists the child's perception of normalcy and breaks down the
child's ability to trust others." Id.
226. Harshaw, supra note 12, at 757-58.
227. Id. at 758.
228. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986). See Matthew J. Eisenberg, Comment, Recovered
Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 249,254
n.36 (1995); see also Berkowitz, supra note 224.
229. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 230.
233. Id. This was supported by the court's view that the testimony of treating
psychologists and psychiatrists was not sufficiently reliable to produce accurate results. Id.
at 229.
234. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229-30.
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As the Tyson dissent pointed out, the discovery rule is based
upon notions of fundamental fairness, not empirical evidence."
The dissent argued that the availability of objective evidence is but
one factor to be considered in deciding whether or not to apply the
discovery rule.1 6  Led by this dissenting opinion and popular
criticism of the majority opinion,237 the Washington Legislature
enacted legislation that overruled Tyson and mandated the
application of the discovery rule to these type of cases.A The
legislature acknowledged that adult survivors of child sexual abuse
''may repress the memory of the abuse or be unable to connect the
abuse to any injury until after the statute of limitations has
run."
239
Since Tyson, courts have become increasingly willing to allow
plaintiffs to invoke the discovery rule in RMS cases.2' In John-
son v. Johnson,241 a case factually similar to Tyson, the plaintiff
alleged that she repressed all memories of sexual abuse and was
therefore unaware of the connection between her psychological
injuries and the abuse.242 The court, applying the discovery rule,
held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when she knew or
should have known of her injury and that it was caused by the acts
of another, and allowed her to proceed with her claim.243
In Wisconsin, the Court of Appeals applied the discovery rule
in a case in which the plaintiff knew of the sexual abuse but was
unable to make the connection between her psychological trauma
and the abuse.2' The court stated that even if the victim had
some doubts about the normalcy of her abuser's conduct, it was
"because of [her abuser's] dominion and authority and her own
235. Id. at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Murray, supra note 224, at 486.
238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1995).
239. Id. (Historical and Statutory Notes, citing 1991 WASH. LAWS, ch. 212).
240. Repressed memory syndrome cases usually involve one of two factual scenarios:
where the plaintiff claims to have known about the sexual abuse but did not realize his or
her psychological problems were a result of the abuse (Type I), or where the plaintiff did not
know about the sexual abuse because he or she repressed the memory until shortly before
filing suit (Type II). Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Most courts have
been unwilling to apply the discovery rule to Type I cases while many courts have been
increasingly willing to apply it to Type II cases. Eisenberg, supra note 228, at 255.
241. 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. I11. 1988).
242. Id. at 1364.
243. Id. at 1370.
244. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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guilt, depression and dissociation, [that] she had no information to
a reasonable probability of the nature of her injuries or the facts
with respect to their cause.""24
Insanity and duress have also been used to toll the statute of
limitations in RMS cases. In Jones v. Jones,24 the plaintiff
claimed that her guilt, shame and the fear of disclosure, coupled
with death threats and beatings by her father, caused her to
suppress all memories of her incestuous relationship with him.247
She claimed that the statute was tolled by reason of her insanity,
and additionally, that the coercive acts by her father caused her
such duress that she was unable to file within the statutory time
limit.
2 48
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held
that the plaintiff's mental distress could constitute insanity that is
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. 249 Commenting on the
many recent studies conducted on child sexual abuse, the court
noted the "disabling psychological impact"2"° that incestuous
sexual abuse can have, and the plausibility of plaintiff's claim that
she had repressed her memories of the abuse.21 Regarding her
allegations of duress, the court stated that despite the nonexistence
of a statutory exception for duress, "a prospective defendant's
coercive acts and threats may rise to such a level of duress as to
deprive the plaintiff of his freedom of will and thereby toll the
statute of limitations.",
212
It is evident that courts have become willing to toll the statute
of limitations in situations where plaintiffs are psychologically
unable to file expeditiously. Whether invoking existing doctrines
or creating equitable exceptions, courts are willing to toll the
statute where strict application would be manifestly unjust. In this
context, the disabling effects of post traumatic stress disorder show
why child sexual abuse victims are incapable, through no fault of
their own, to take action to help themselves. This same reasoning
245. Id. at 26.
246. 576 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
247. Id. at 318.
248. Id. at 319.
249. Id. at 321.
250. Id.
251. Jones, 576 A.2d at 321.
252. Id. at 322.
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applies to victims of domestic violence to explain why they are
unable to bring timely claims against their abusers.
C. Comparing BWS to RMS: Tolling the Statute of Limitations
for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
Courts that have tolled the statute of limitations for plaintiffs
suffering from RMS have employed similar reasoning to the
Giovine court's rationale behind creating a new cause of action for
BWS. This is not surprising because both BWS and RMS are
subcategories of the same medical condition-post traumatic stress
disorder.53 This psychological condition is used to explain why
these plaintiffs are unable to assert timely claims against their
abusers.
Both victims of child sexual abuse and of spousal abuse are
subjected to a pattern of violence that can traumatize them into
helplessness. Common characteristics of people suffering from
RMS or BWS include low self-worth, distrust of others and the
feeling that nothing they do can influence their situation.'
Many victims perceive their abuse as normal, or they feel they are
responsible for the abuse and try to keep it secret. 55  They
consequently have a difficult time seeking help and are left to deal
with their emotional problems alone. 6 This is especially true for
children who have not experienced any other kind of treatment and
women who have grown up in violent households.7 When their
abusers impose secrecy upon them, often coupled with threats of
violence, they can become "trapped by their own fear."2 8  They
consequently internalize their feelings which can lead to other
psychosomatic physical injuries.2 9
Societal factors also help to explain why these victims do not
bring charges against their abusers within the statute of limitations.
Fear that their allegations will not be believed, a sense of humilia-
253. See supra note 95 and part IV.B.2.
254. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984); Clevenger, supra note 143, at 450.
255. See Ferrante, supra note 223, at 206; Waits, supra note 46, at 279-82.
256. See Ferrante, supra note 223, at 205-07; Waits, supra note 46, at 281.
257. See Harshaw, supra note 12, at 757; WALKER, supra note 51, at 146-50.
258. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
259. See supra note 95 and part IV.B.2. "The disorders resulting from these events may
be either a combination of physical and mental disorders, or solely a residual mental
incapacity continuing after a physical injury has healed. PTSD can exist even when a trauma
victim has not suffered demonstrable physical injury." Harshaw, supra note 12, at 756.
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tion and shame,26 and a dependency on their abusers, both
economical and psychological, all lead to another level of subjuga-
tion and control over the victims. This further reinforces their
feelings of helplessness and futility, and explains why they do not
take affirmative action to improve their situations.
The means by which the statute is tolled is articulated
differently in each case, but they are essentially the same. In each
case the court is faced with a plaintiff who has failed to file a claim
within the statute of limitations. The court then creates an
equitable exception to toll the statute in the interest of fundamental
fairness. There has been a definite trend to create such exceptions
for adult survivors of child sexual abuse who suffer from the effects
of post-traumatic stress disorder. It must follow that battered
women who suffer from the same condition as a result of a similar
pattern of abuse should be granted the same protection under the
law that has been afforded to child sexual abuse victims.
The law has already recognized the devastating effects of child
sexual abuse and has heeded the call to protect its victims.
Similarly, the problems of domestic violence have been brought to
the surface, as seen by the enaction of various criminal and quasi-
criminal anti-abuse laws.2 61 The next logical step in helping these
victims is civil remuneration. It is time that the law act on behalf
of battered women in the same way it has for adult survivors of
child sexual abuse.
D. Potential Criticisms and the Viability of the Giovine BWS
Tort
As with any new cause of action, there will be criticisms.
Concerns will arise that a "flood of litigation '2 62 will result from
the expansion of existing law. Critics will caution that the number
of lawsuits will increase as this new tort becomes used as a weapon
in hostile divorce proceedings, rather than a means by which to
compensate serious harm. These opponents may further contend
that this new tort will not serve its intended purpose, but will create
an opportunity for a plethora of frivolous claims.
The "floodgates" criticism is largely unsubstantiated. When
courts first began to recognize the claim of intentional infliction of
260. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
261. See supra part II.B.
262. KEETON ET AL., supra note 204, at § 12, 56.
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emotional distress, the same concerns were raised.2" Those fears
proved illusory. The plaintiff's heavy burden in proving outrageous
conduct was made sufficiently high to discourage meritless
claims.2' The very fact that most claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress do not succeed shows that this has been an
effective means of stemming frivolous litigation.2 65
Similarly, tolling of the statute of limitations for BWS does not
translate into instant recovery. It merely gives victims of domestic
abuse their day in court. They must still establish pretrial that they
are suffering from BWS and that the syndrome was the reason they
were unable to file within the statutory time limit.2" The trial
judge then has the ultimate discretion to decide if tolling the statute
and allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her cause of action is
warranted under the circumstances.267 These limitations are
sufficient to filter any meritless claims out of the system.
Furthermore, the mere possibility of increased litigation is not
a valid reason to preclude a viable cause of action. If the new
cause of action allows many more people to receive compensation
for their injuries, it has served its purpose, not thwarted the system.
"It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to
deny relief on such grounds."2"
Another potential criticism of the BWS tort is that it conflicts
with the underlying policy behind statutes of limitations. Barring
claims outside of the limitations period ensures that the defendant
will not be unfairly prejudiced by having to defend against a stale
claim. Consequently, it may be said that tolling the statute of
limitations for BWS eliminates this protection. A defendant would
263. Id.
264. See Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978). "[W]e see no virtue in basing
a rule of law on a speculative fear of increased litigation. We prefer to rely upon the burden
of proof as the best protection against unwarranted, meretricious or merely vindictive
litigation." Id.
265. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 631 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring and
dissenting). "A review of the cases in which intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress is alleged indicates that while the claim is routinely asserted, it is seldom successful."
Id.
266. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 117 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
267. Id. "[T]he determination whether to toll the statute of limitations is a legal question
'within the province of the court."' Id. (quoting Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J.
1973)).
268. KEETON ET AL., supra note 204, at § 12, 56.
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be expected to account for each incident that caused the plaintiff's
condition, no matter how long ago it allegedly occurred.
While tolling the statute of limitations for BWS could have a
prejudicial effect on the defendant, it is balanced by the increased
difficulty placed on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must always prove
her case. Meeting this burden is much harder when the allegations
refer to incidents that have occurred many years prior to the
litigation. Moreover, such evidence may be viewed with more
skepticism by both the judge and the jury because the potential for
inaccuracy is increased as the evidence becomes older.
Taking this into consideration, it would not be unfair to toll
the statute of limitations under these circumstances. The policy
behind barring old claims is grounded in fairness to the parties.
Where applying the statute would contravene this policy, courts
have a duty to create remedies. This is precisely why courts have
developed equitable exceptions to the statute of limitations. It
would therefore be manifestly unjust to bar the claims of a plaintiff
who suffers from BWS when she can show that she was unable to
file expeditiously because of her condition.
Finally, it may be said that the Giovine BWS tort goes too far
in its attempt to remedy the problems of domestic abuse. Critics
will contend that existing causes of action are adequate to compen-
sate injuries arising out of a marriage. A woman who alleges a
claim of battery may, if successful, recover for medical expenses,
lost wages and pain and suffering, which would include "the
psychological sequelae of any act of battering."269 Furthermore,
the possibility exists that creating liability for BWS would allow the
plaintiff to recover twice: once for the individual batteries, and
once for the cumulative effect of the batteries under the guise of
the syndrome. This double-recovery would have the effect of
punishing the defendant rather than compensating the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, the existing civil remedies available to victims
of domestic violence have been wholly ineffective in compensating
the types of injuries arising from long-term abuse. No matter what
types of damages are awarded, they can only be apportioned to the
tortious acts that occurred within the statute of limitations. This
type of recovery totally ignores the problem of long-term spousal
abuse and the resulting psychological condition that perpetuates it.
The plaintiff must be able to receive compensation for all of the
269. Giovine, 663 A.2d at 125 (Skillman, J., concurring and dissenting).
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batteries that were committed during the abusive relationship.
Allowing recovery for the present medical condition of battered
woman's syndrome, which is the result of the history of abuse, is
the only way to achieve fair compensation.
Furthermore, the concerns that a plaintiff would receive an
excessive award are unfounded. With precise jury instructions
under the law and careful evaluations of the verdicts, the chances
of a plaintiff receiving an unreasonably large sum are remote.
Moreover, even in the unlikely event that this should occur, these
verdicts are subject to review. This ensures that the plaintiff can
recover no more than is warranted by the factual findings.
V. Conclusion
Formulating the condition of battered woman's syndrome into
a recoverable cause of action underscores the seriousness of
domestic violence and finally provides victims of domestic abuse
the ability to seek complete recovery for long-term domestic abuse.
This sends a message to society that spousal abuse will no longer
be tolerated by the law, and will encourage more victims to file
charges against their abusers, knowing that their attempts to hold
their abusers liable will not be futile. Giving credence to BWS will
increase the awareness and understanding of the problem and help
to change the societal attitudes that have condoned spousal abuse.
For too long the problem of domestic violence has been
ignored by the law. Allowing recovery for the syndrome is the next
logical step in addressing the problem. Just as New Jersey set a
national precedent by declaring battered woman's syndrome
evidence admissible in a criminal trial, so should it lead the country
in allowing civil recovery for battered woman's syndrome.
David E. Poplar
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